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Abstract 
The Anglo-American and Israeli-American security relationships have proved to be unusually 
close and have confounded expectations that they would wither away with the changing 
international environment. In order to explain this, the article proposes a theory of ‘alliance 
persistence’ that is based on reciprocity over shared geostrategic interests, sentimental 
attachments and institutionalized security relations. The article employs this theoretical 
framework to explore how Anglo-American and Israeli-American relations have developed 
during the Obama administration. It argues that the Anglo-American relationship has been 
closer because of the two countries’ shared strategic interests, whilst the Israeli-American 
relationship has experienced divergences in how the security interests of the two sides have 
been pursued.  The article concludes by assessing how the two relationships will fair in the 
post-Obama era and argues that there are numerous areas of tension in the US-Israeli 
relationship that risk future tensions.  
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Introduction  
The US has multiple ‘Special Relationships’ by virtue of the fact that it is a global 
superpower and its interests overlap with those of many countries around the world. The term 
‘special relationship’ has been overused: so far US Presidents have acknowledged twenty 
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nine special relationships between their country and other states.
1
 Amongst this range of 
special relationships, the ones with the United Kingdom (UK) and Israel are seen as 
particularly special. President John F. Kennedy once proclaimed that ‘The United States has a 
special relationship with Israel in the Middle East, really comparable only to that which it has 
with Britain over a wide range of world affairs’.2 Not only have the Anglo-American special 
relationship (AASR) and Israeli-American special relationship (IASR) been given rhetorical 
prominence by US Presidents but they have also been characterised by unique practical 
cooperation: in the fields of conventional military affairs, nuclear weapons and intelligence 
sharing. Nevertheless, these two special relationships are qualitatively different in terms of 
their levels of security cooperation, thereby meriting a detailed comparison in this article. 
Surprisingly, there has so far been little dialogue between scholarship of the AASR and the 
IASR. This article seeks to bridge that gap. 
 
Both special relationships exist largely outside formal treaty arrangements. The US-UK 
relationship is part of the Washington Treaty of 1949 that created the multilateral framework 
of NATO, but their bilateral relationship has flourished outside this treaty structure, The US-
Israeli relationship has not been codified into a formal treaty relationship and the countries 
are not joint members of any overarching multilateral alliance. In 1987, as part of the 
National Defence Authorization Act, the US Congress designated Israel as a major non-
NATO ally, thereby authorising consultation and cooperation across multiple fields of 
activity.   
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Both special relationships have confounded the expectations of those that thought they would 
fade over time. In the case of the AASR, it survived during the Cold War and adapted 
afterwards to a range of contemporary international challenges, including transnational 
terrorism, nuclear proliferation and state failure. As regards the IASR, there has been a heated 
debate over what factors have contributed to its durability since the end of the Cold War. 
Mearsheimer and Walt advanced four main arguments:
3
 mutual strategic advantage;
4
 the 
US’s sense of moral responsibility; the identification of the American people and the political 
elite with Israel 
5
 and the influence of the Israel lobby. This article argues that none of these 
four arguments alone can explain adequately the continuing relationship.  
 
This article seeks to explain the continuities and changes in the AASR and the IASR since 
President Obama took power in 2009. It proposes a theory of alliance persistence in order to 
account for why these two relationships have endured and remained special. It demonstrates 
that while both relationships are special, they differ in the degree of their intimacy. The 
article concludes by assessing how the AASR and the IASR may fair in the post-Obama era.     
 
Why do alliances persist?  
Attention has traditionally been devoted to how alliances, or alliance-like relationships, are 
created. Relatively limited attention has been paid to theorising and explaining their 
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continuation.
6
 Realist scholarship leads to the expectation that alliances will break up after 
the reason for their creation has ended and selfish interests return to the foreground. This has 
resulted in expectations that an organization like NATO is doomed in the long term. In 
contrast, institutionalists and constructivists have come to challenge neorealist understanding 
of alliance behaviour: institutionalists argue that high levels of institutionalization can help to 
explain the persistence of NATO after the Cold War
7
 while constructivists argue that 
collective identity is a key factor. 
8
  
 
Jae Jeok Park puts forwards a new theoretical framework in explaining the persistence of the 
US-led alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. His chief argument is that an alliance persists 
when it functions to ‘insure an existing order against an unfavourable long-term security 
trend to their members’.9 However, his theoretical framework has limited utility in relation to 
the AASR where a weakened Russia can make trouble in Europe, as it has done in Ukraine, 
but it is not powerful enough to challenge the overall status quo. Similarly, it cannot explain 
the persistence of the IASR where although Iran seeks to challenge the American-dominant 
order in the Middle East, Israel stands in opposition to US policies towards Iran. 
 
It is argued here that there are three main factors determining the persistence of an alliance. 
The first factor is the extent to which allies share a reciprocal relationship, with each of them 
providing some utility that is indispensable to advance their shared geostrategic interests. 
Current scholarship of both Anglo-American and Israeli-American relations emphasizes the 
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importance of shared interests. However, shared interests do not necessarily strengthen their 
relationship if there is no reciprocity in advancing such interests. Reciprocity is a key element 
of a persistent alliance. As will be explained in the next section, a lack of reciprocity between 
Israel and the US has weakened their relationship during the Obama era, despite these two 
countries having many interests in common across the Middle East.  
 
A state’s utility may take a number of different forms: it may be geography, they may share a 
common adversary or a stronger country may see its ally as a buffer against an enemy’s 
expansion. The stronger power may be able to offer protection and security, without which 
the survival of the weaker state could be endangered. The weaker state may add a small but 
significant capability that makes a difference to a larger ally. The degree of utility a state can 
offer determines whether it is considered by its ally as a strategic asset, a strategic irrelevance 
or a strategic liability. A state is a strategic asset if it helps its ally to achieve foreign policy 
goals. By contrast, a state is a strategic liability if it serves as a hindrance to its ally’s foreign 
policy goals or as a strategic irrelevance if it proves to be neither useful nor harmful.  
 
The second factor is the extent to which allies share sentimental attachments. This refers to a 
state’s favourable feelings or affection towards its ally at both the societal and the elite level. 
The extent of the sentimental attachment determines the strength of collective identity 
between them. Identity is a socially constructed phenomenon and helps to shape how 
policymakers see the world and who they regard as like-minded partners. It not only defines 
who we are, but also delineates the boundaries against the others.
10
 Collective identity is 
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important, because it is ‘the sense of us’ that enables states to define their common interests 
in a particular manner.
11
  
 
Collective identity can derive from a number of sources. It can arise from a sense of shared 
heritage and historical experience, from common language, cultural affinities or religion. 
Alternatively, it can develop from shared political attributes such as democratic systems of 
government or market economies. Usually, for a strong bond to develop between two 
countries, a mix of factors overlap with one another. In addition, patterns of cooperation are 
vital contributors to a strong collective identity between states. Wendt uses the term 
‘cooperative acts’ to describe the influence of behavioural practice on the formation of 
collective identity. He argues that repeated cooperative acts have two effects on the formation 
of collective identity. First, ‘By showing others through cooperative acts that one expects 
them to be co-operators too, one changes the intersubjective knowledge in terms of which 
their identities are defined’. 12  Second, through repeated cooperative acts, ‘Actors are 
simultaneously learning to identify with each other — to see themselves as a “we” bound by 
certain norms’.13  
 
Collective identity helps to build patterns of understanding and trust that undergird the 
relationship and give it durability during times of tension. It creates an expectation that the 
other side can be relied upon. It demarcates allies that can be trusted from enemies that need 
either to be deterred or confronted. In the words of Barnett, there is ‘...an important 
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relationship between identity and the construction of threat’.14 Allies have a key part to play 
in helping to address these threats and provide a coalition of like-minded actors. It also helps 
to shape behaviours in alliance relationships, to ensure predictability of action that fosters 
trust. 
 
The third factor is the extent to which a security relationship is institutionalized. Current 
scholarship of Anglo-American relations and Israeli-American relations pay relatively little 
attention to this factor. Institutionalization refers to the presence of organizations, formal or 
informal rules or agreements, which reinforce norms, routinize practices and differentiate 
functions of the involved actors.
15
 It leads states to act together in regularised patterns of 
behaviour and confers predictability and strength upon their relationship. Institutionalization 
involves linking together a multiplicity of government departments, transnationally. The 
various security agencies of the two states share planning, threat assessments and insights. 
Bringing together such a range of actors plays an important part in ensuring the longevity of a 
bilateral relationship, because it creates a range of stakeholders with a vested interest in its 
continuation. This increases the chance that periodic tensions between political elites from 
the two countries will not undermine the entire relationship. In the words of Walt, ‘The 
greater the level of institutionalization within an alliance, the more likely it is to endure 
despite an extensive change in the array of external threats’.16  
 
Institutionalization makes cooperation between allies path-dependent. Path-dependence 
creates inertia or ‘stickiness’, encouraging allies to maintain the momentum of their 
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cooperation in a particular direction.
17
 An institutionalized alliance is more likely to persist, 
because it is easier and more cost-effective to adapt existing institutions than create new ones, 
especially when the old institutions still deliver benefits for those involved.
18
 
 
Institutionalization also helps to solidify mutual trust. High-level institutionalization can only 
be achieved when there is considerable trust between the parties as it involves exposing the 
workings of one’s own government to the other side. In return, practical interactions become 
underpinned by routinized practices and norms.
19
 Since personnel, especially government 
officials, interact with each other regularly throughout their lifetime, they are more likely to 
build durable personal relationships that help to sustain cooperation. 
 
It is argued here that institutionalization and collective identity are important factors in 
contributing to alliance persistence but they are not sufficient in themselves. Only when 
reciprocal cooperation advances the geostrategic interests of the states concerned will an 
alliance persist. For the purposes of this analysis, the three factors have been separated out, 
but in reality they are woven together and mutually reinforcing. Reciprocity provides a 
motivation for states to continue and expand their cooperation and this reinforces both 
collective identity and patterns of institutionalization. Since their relationship is mutually 
beneficial, states are willing to maintain old institutions as well as adapt them to new 
purposes. Institutionalization contributes to close personal relationships between security 
actors and this feeds a sense of collective identity.  
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The value of this theoretical approach of alliance persistence lies not in advancing new 
concepts but in drawing together and combining already well developed approaches in 
international relations. Of these three factors, the reciprocity in advancing shared security 
interests is the most important factor in keeping an alliance persistent. The weakening of 
reciprocity in advancing shared geostrategic interests leads to the weakening of both the 
sentimental and institutional aspects of the two countries’ relations. 
 
Reciprocity within the AASR and IASR: Strategic asset or strategic 
liability? 
 
The AASR and the IASR are both relationships founded upon security considerations.
20
 This 
makes them inherently special because security is related to national survival and is the most 
sensitive issue between sovereign states. The degree of reciprocity in security cooperation 
between countries determines the significance they attach to each other. This section explores 
whether the Obama administration considered the UK and Israel to be strategic assets and 
whether their value increased or diminished during this period.  
 
The US and the UK have continued their reciprocal cooperative relationship since 2009. In 
spite of the gap in resources between them, the UK has shared America’s sense of being a 
global power with responsibility for maintaining international order. The UK remains the 
fifth largest economy in terms of nominal GDP, with the fastest growth rate in the Group of 
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Seven leading industrial states.
21
 The UK has actively sought to support and contribute to the 
maintenance of American leadership; seeing that as of benefit not only to the world as a 
whole, but also to Britain’s own influence within it. This is exemplified by the fact that the 
Anglo-American voting partnership within the UN has much stronger than that between the 
US and any other permanent members of the Security Council.
22
 In addition, the UK’s 
intelligence agencies have been valuable partners of American agencies with a similar global 
outlook.
23
  
 
The UK has been willing to back its commitment to the US with hard power. As the fifth 
strongest military power in the world, the UK has sought to remain America’s most important 
partner and has provided valuable military capabilities when the US has gone to war. As a 
reflection of the alignment of their geostrategic interests, they have worked together in a 
series of military operations. The UK was the second largest military contributor, after the 
US, to the military operations in Afghanistan (2001-2014) and Iraq (2003-2011).
24
 There 
were tensions between London and Washington over the speed of the UK’s withdrawal from 
southern Iraq but these had abated by the time Obama was President. In the case of the 
drawdown from Afghanistan, the two countries coordinated their activities. In other 
operations the Cameron government pushed the US to support the 2011 military campaign 
against Gaddafi in Libya. In spite of Obama’s strategy of ‘leading from behind’, the US 
remained a key player in the NATO-led military intervention in Libya with the UK the third 
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largest contributor.
25
 In the case of Iraq, following the overwhelming support of the House of 
Commons on 26 September 2014, the UK has been an important participant in the American-
led coalition air strikes and intelligence gathering against Islamic State (IS).
26
  
 
In contrast to the UK, Israel’s formidable military forces have been of little strategic value to 
Washington. As former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia Chas Freeman argues, ‘[Israel] is so 
estranged from everyone else in the Middle East …(and) is therefore useless in terms of 
support for American power projection’.27 Israel has never participated in a US-led coalition: 
for example, it did not send any troops to take part in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, as 
this would have risked alienating other actors.
28
 Even in relations with a country like Turkey, 
hitherto willing to engage in structured cooperation with the Israeli government, tensions 
over the 2010 Gaza Flotilla incident and the subsequent conflict in Gaza have resulted in Tel 
Aviv’s further isolation. Turkey has since refused to participate in training and arms 
procurement with Israel. 
 
The US remains committed to the survival of Israel: its annual military aid of approximately 
$3 billion a year has ensured Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME) over hostile Arab 
neighbours.
29
 The US has also provided financial support for ‘Israel’s Iron Dome anti-rocket 
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system and joint U.S.-Israel missile defence programs such as Arrow and David’s Sling’.30 
Yet the US has been unable to draw on Israel’s strengths against common enemies for fear of 
damaging coalitions that include Arab states. For example, the Israeli Air Force, which is 
recognized as amongst the best in the world,
31
 has played no role in operations against IS. 
The two sides also differ in the significance they attach to terrorist threats from the region. 
Israel views Hamas and Hezbollah as the primary challenges to its security whilst the US 
emphasises the risks emanating from Al-Qaeda and IS.
32
 In America’s eyes, Hamas and 
Hezbollah remain terrorist organisations but Hezbollah’s role in fighting IS forces in Syria 
challenges the old paradigm that it is entirely hostile to western interests.
33
  
 
During the Obama era, the strategic interests of the US and Israel have diverged. As Waxman 
argues, ‘All too often, the United States and Israel have different priorities and favour 
different strategies’.34 This was illustrated by the debate over Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons 
programme.  Whilst the UK was part of the P5+1 − the five permanent members of the 
UNSC, plus Germany − the Netanyahu government was steadfast in its opposition to the 
entire process. Israel advocated a military option to prevent Iranian nuclear proliferation.
35
 
The Obama administration sought to address Iranian nuclear ambitions through peaceful 
diplomatic means, underpinned by economic sanctions, and warned that an Israeli strike 
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would be ‘very destabilizing’.36 US Defence Secretary Robert Gates rejected a request from 
Israel for bunker busting bombs and overflying rights of Iraq.
37
 The US calculated that a 
military option was not feasible: Israel would only delay the Iranian nuclear programme and 
would simultaneously place US personnel in Iraq in peril. America feared being drawn into a 
war against its better judgement, in order to complete an operation that had been started by its 
ally. In private the US put intense pressure on the Israeli government not to attack Iran. 
 
An agreement between the six powers and Iran was reached on 14 July 2015 and it stands as 
one of the major accomplishments of the Obama administration. Yet the Netanyahu 
government has continued to denounce the deal in spite of American offers to compensate 
Tel Aviv with greater levels of military support. Israel has long regarded a nuclear armed Iran 
as an existential threat that would promote a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and could 
even result in war.
38
 Israel warns that under the terms of the deal Iran will not only preserve 
its nuclear infrastructure but it will be able to cross the nuclear threshold in a relatively short 
space of time. Furthermore, the lifting of economic sanctions will give the regime in Tehran 
the resources to fund terrorist groups committed to creating chaos in the Middle East. The US 
administration retaliated by refusing to share all of the details of the nuclear negotiations with 
Israel.
39
 This demonstrates a degree of mutual suspicion that is highly corrosive in the 
relationship.  
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The Anglo-American security relationship has continued to provide mutual security benefits 
during the Obama era in spite of the drawdown of the major military operations in which they 
were engaged. In the case of the Israeli-American relationship, as Eisenstadt and Pollock 
have argued, the US has benefited from its cooperation with Israel in intelligence sharing, 
missile defence, counterterrorism and arm sales.
40
 However, upon closer inspection, such 
benefits Israel has provided to the US are incommensurate with its status as an ally enjoying a 
special relationship. Israel has played only a minor role in advancing American geostrategic 
interests in the Middle East. Worse still, it has more often than not played a 
counterproductive role impeding American efforts, as in the case of the nuclear agreement 
with Iran – even to the point of becoming a strategic liability. 
 
Sentimental attachments within the AASR and the IASR 
The US, UK and Israel are liberal democracies with a shared commitment to universal 
suffrage, the rule of law, human rights and market economics. As two Anglo-Saxon countries 
with a common history and language, sentimental attachments have contributed to a strong 
Anglo-American collective identity during Obama’s Presidency. Whilst America and Israel 
continue to celebrate the values that they have in common, their collective identity, 
reinforced by Jews living in the US, has shown signs of weakening during the last decade. In 
order to better understand the role of sentimental attachments within both relationships, it is 
useful to differentiate between the elite and the public level. 
 
At the elite level, UK Prime Minister David Cameron built a warmer and more amicable 
personal relationship with President Obama than his predecessor Gordon Brown. Brown had 
sought to distance the UK from accusations of sycophancy that had plagued Tony Blair’s 
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dealings with President Bush. The sense of camaraderie engendered between the Obama 
administration and the Cameron government was temporarily strained in 2010 by the British 
Petroleum (BP) oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, but both sides made efforts to ensure that the 
incident did not cause lasting damage.
41
 Of greater threat to the relationship was the veto in 
2013 imposed by the House of Commons on British military intervention in Syria. This came 
at a key moment for President Obama as it accused the Assad regime of crossing one of 
America’s ‘red lines’ by conducting chemical weapon attacks against civilians. The Sun 
newspaper ran a front-page valediction for the Anglo-American special relationship
42
, 
arguing that failure to support American leadership would do irreparable damage, whilst The 
Washington Post declared the action to be the biggest rupture since the 1982 Falklands 
War.
43
 Despite all of these warnings of impending doom, the elite level relationship emerged 
largely unscathed from these experiences. This was partly because public opinion within the 
US was against military intervention and the crisis was defused by the negotiated removal of 
the offending weapons from Syrian territory.  
 
In contrast to the strengths of the AASR, the IASR has suffered from the poor personal 
chemistry between a Democratic President, Barack Obama and a right of centre Israeli Prime 
Minister, Benyamin Netanyahu, who was dependent on religious parties to shore up his 
coalition. The Israeli Ambassador to Washington, Michael Oren, noted that, in addition to the 
President, many of the senior members of the Obama administration either expressed their 
dislike of the Israeli government or their intense disapproval of its policies. These included 
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former White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel,
44
 former Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton,
45
 Vice President Joe Biden,
46
 former Secretary of Defence Robert Gates,
47
 former 
US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice,
48
 and former National Security Advisor Tom 
Donilon.
49
 The policies that most frequently irked members of the US government related to 
the Israel-Gaza conflict in the summer of 2014 and the building of Jewish settlements in the 
West Bank and East Jerusalem. In the eyes of the US administration, Netanyahu paid lip-
service to the idea of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian problem but made little 
effort to realise that vision. This made it increasingly difficult for the US to defend Israeli 
policy within the United Nations. 
 
In addition to these sources of tension between elites, the issue of the Iranian nuclear 
negotiations caused particular damage to the US-Israeli sentimental relationship. This was 
because the Obama administration perceived the Israeli government to be deliberately 
courting the Republican Party in an effort to undermine the talks. Prime Minister Netanyahu 
gave a speech on the subject of Iran to the American Congress on 4 March 2015, without an 
invitation from the White House.
50
 That Netanyahu allied with the Republicans against 
Obama and the Democrats cast a shadow over the US’s bipartisan support for Israel. The 
relationship between the two countries is ‘especially threatened when an Israeli Prime 
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Minister is seen as openly challenging the U.S President, asking the country and the Congress 
to side with a foreign Prime Minister over America’s President’.51  
 
At the public level, the trends in the two relationships have been more difficult to gauge.  The 
American people have continued to have very strong, favourable feelings towards Britain 
(see Figure 1).  There have been no signs of weakening in American affection towards the 
UK at the societal level: it has consistently been the second most favourable country, next 
only to Canada.
52
 Moreover, there have been no indications of a divide of American opinion 
towards the UK along partisan, religious or ethnic lines. This is in spite of the growing 
Hispanic population that is changing that country’s demographic profile. According to a 
survey conducted by Chatham House, this US affection for the UK was reciprocated: the US 
ranked third among Briton’s most favourable countries, both in 2012 and in 2014, behind 
only Australia and Canada.
53
 The Pew Research Centre opinion polls also show that the 
British have continued to have favourable feelings towards the US since 2009 (see Figure 2). 
There was a surge in positive attitudes in 2009, demonstrating that President Obama was 
much more popular than President Bush, due to the latter’s Iraqi policies. There existed anti-
Bush sentiment in the UK before 2009, but by and large, there has remained no meaningful 
anti-Americanism.
54
 Whilst public opinion does not drive national policy, it provides a 
cushion against periodic tensions within the relationship. 
Figure 1. Percentages of American People's Very/Mostly Favourable Foreign Countries, 2003-2015 
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Source: Gallup, ‘Country Ratings’, 2015, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/1624/perceptions-foreign-
countries.aspx>.  
Figure 2 Percentages of the UK and Israel's Favourable Views towards the US 
 
Source: Pew Research Centre, ‘Global Indicators Database’, 
<http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/1/survey/1/>.  
As shown by Figures 1 and 2, there has existed a strong sentimental attachment between the 
publics of the US and Israel since 2009. In fact, according to a 25-country poll conducted by 
the BBC World Service in 2013, the US was the only country that held favourable views of 
Israel: 41% positive and 33% negative. All other major Western countries held 
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predominantly negative views of Israel, including Germany (77%), France (66%) and the UK 
(65%). The surveys conducted by Greenberg Rosner Quinlin Research for the Israeli Project 
and by the Anti-Defamation League also reveal the sharp divide of views between the US and 
other Western countries.
55
 The fact that Israel is the only liberal democracy in the Middle 
East is not a decisive factor in eliciting strong support from the American people. Rather, 
there are particular factors in the US that help to account for its support for Israel: an affluent 
and influential Jewish community which is a vocal constituency in American domestic 
politics
56
; the religiosity that leads Evangelical Christians to support the state of Israel
57
 and, 
lastly the pro-Israel lobby in Washington DC, spearheaded by the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee (AIPAC). There have been great controversies over the influence of 
AIPAC, as evidenced by varied responses
58
 to the book by John Mearsheimer and Stephen 
Walt, but its influence and uncritical support of the Netanyahu government has been evident 
during the Obama era. 
Unlike the US’s attachment to the UK, US public opinion towards Israel has become 
increasingly divided. There are more American people questioning the wisdom of unqualified 
support for Israel and critical of the Netanyahu government’s policies, especially related to 
Palestinian issues. Whilst Republicans and conservatives have expressed their support, 
Democrats and liberals have increasingly berated Israel’s policies. Other sources of criticism 
have arisen from mainstream Protestant churches as well as from younger, non-Orthodox 
Jews.
59
 Against this background, ‘J Street’ was founded in April 2008 and has since become 
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a rising star among Israeli lobby groups.
60
 Unlike AIPAC, J Street has opposed many of the 
actions of the Netanyahu government, for instance, it was at the forefront of support for the 
nuclear agreement with Iran.
61
  
Institutionalization of the AASR and the IASR 
Contacts between the US, British and Israeli security institutions are both multi-levelled and 
extensive. Their national security staff, ministries of defence, armed forces, intelligence 
agencies and defence contractors are drawn together in a complex web of interactions. The 
conduct of this regular interchange and the embedded nature of personnel within these 
organisations results in a set of relationships that are highly institutionalized. Within the three 
main spheres of these institutionalized relationships − namely, intelligence, nuclear 
cooperation and contacts between their armed services − the degree of specialness differs. In 
the case of the IASR, the process of institutionalization only became formalised in the 1988 
Memorandum of Agreement on Security Cooperation. The AASR has been in existence for 
longer: for example, the UK-USA Agreement on intelligence sharing was reached in 1946 
whilst the Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) on nuclear sharing was signed in 1958. 
In the intelligence domain, the Obama period has witnessed a deepening of the relationship 
with the UK. Its intimacy is attested to by the fact that the chief of the London station of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) attends the weekly meetings of the Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC), the UK’s most senior intelligence coordination body.62 Signals intelligence 
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(SIGINT) cooperation has continued with regular personnel exchanges between America’s 
National Security Agency (NSA) and the UK’s Government Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ).
63
  This has become closer than ever, as evidenced by their expanding cooperation 
on internet surveillance programmes, such as ‘PRISM’ and ‘Tempora’, which were revealed 
by whistle-blower Edward Snowden in 2013. In return for a significant financial contribution, 
GCHQ has continued to have privileged access to the valuable data gathered by the NSA’s 
SIGINT satellites since cancellation of its ‘ZIRCON’ project.64  In turn, the NSA invested at 
least £100 million in GCHQ between 2011 and 2013, demonstrating their belief that their ally 
has valuable expertise from which the US can benefit.
65
  
Cybersecurity has become a new area of intelligence cooperation between the UK and the 
US. When President Obama visited the UK in May 2011, he affirmed his country’s desire to 
work together on cybersecurity issues 
66
 and this was endorsed during Prime Minister 
Cameron’s return visit to the US in January 2015. For example, GCHQ and the domestic 
intelligence service MI5 are currently working with their American counterparts to establish a 
joint cyber cell, with an operating presence in each country.
67
 
In comparison to AASR intelligence cooperation, IASR cooperation is less institutionalized. 
Even though they have worked together for some years, there still exists mutual distrust 
between their intelligence agencies. The CIA’s Near East Division reportedly considers Israel 
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as its foremost counter-intelligence threat,
68
 whilst an NSA document leaked by Edward 
Snowden in 2014, ranked Israel as the third most aggressive intelligence service after China 
and Russia.
69
 What further illustrates the deep mutual distrust between the two sides is that 
the US found out about Israel’s spy operation against the US-Iran secret nuclear talks, 
through espionage conducted against Israel.
70
 Yet despite this pattern of competition, areas of 
cooperation also exist. During Obama’s period in office, the NSA has shared significant 
amounts of signals intelligence with its Israeli counterpart, the SIGINT National Unit (ISNU, 
also known as Unit 8200). In many cases, the NSA and ISNU work cooperatively with other 
spy agencies, such as the UK’s GCHQ and Canada’s Communications Security 
Establishment Canada (CSEC).
71
 Unlike NSA and the ISNU’s close partnership, the CIA and 
its Israeli counterpart Mossad have an ambiguous relationship which remains plagued by the 
Jonathan Pollard case, a US intelligence officer who was jailed for passing secrets to Israel 
and was released on parole in November 2015.
72
  
In the nuclear field, Anglo-American cooperation embodies institutionalization unparalleled 
anywhere in the world. The 1958 MDA was renewed in 2014 for a further decade, 
formalizing the regular exchange of nuclear information, nuclear technology cooperation as 
well as the transfer of nuclear warhead-related materials.
73
 There are a series of Joint 
Working Groups (JOWOGs) through which the main patterns of cooperation are conducted 
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and these are supplemented by sub-JOWOGs as well as other specialized forms of 
collaboration.
74
 The 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA) provided the basis for the UK to 
acquire the American Trident D5 missile system, to which it fits its own warheads and 
produces its own submarines. The Cameron government re-affirmed the Blair government’s 
decision to renew Britain’s nuclear deterrent by purchasing a successor missile system from 
the US.
75
 In expectation of that development the decision was announced to invest £500 
million in upgrading the nuclear submarine facilities on the Clyde.
76
 
In comparison, it is much harder to discuss IASR nuclear cooperation because it remains 
shrouded in secrecy: Israel maintains a policy of neither confirming nor denying its nuclear 
status. The fact that the US assisted the Israeli nuclear programme in the past and made 
available its test facilities makes it reasonable to suppose that collaboration has continued. 
With American support, Israel has managed to maintain its nuclear weapons without them 
being placed under scrutiny by the international community. The Obama administration has 
prevented Israel from being pressured to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) and place its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
safeguards.
77
 For instance, in the UN conference on the NPT in May 2015 the USA blocked 
an Egyptian-led drive on a possible Middle East nuclear weapons ban, which aimed at 
pressuring Israel.
78
 However, the covert nature of Israel’s weapons establishment means that 
there is no equivalent of the shared delivery systems that exist between the US and the UK, 
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with all the associated industrial collaboration that accompanies them and the operational 
cooperation between the two militaries.  
The military-to-military relationships within the IASR and the AASR have always been 
important and have remained so under the Obama administration. Although the personal 
chemistry between heads of state can fluctuate, the web of contacts between their respective 
armed forces provides a source of continuity. It is founded upon professional respect and it 
has the benefit of according each side insights into the threat assessments and strategic 
thinking of the other. The Anglo-American military relationship is underpinned by their 
membership within NATO. The UK holds many of the subordinate positions within NATO 
under US officers, most notably the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Alliance 
operations, such as in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, have also served to strengthen the 
linkages between British officers and their American counterparts. 
The US and Israel, as well as the US and UK, embed officers in the militaries of the other 
side; they send personnel to attend the other’s academies and they conduct joint training and 
exercises.
79
 According to Oren, ‘In areas as diverse as weapons development, joint training .. 
and educational exchanges, the cooperation was superb’.80 Both the Israeli Air Force and the 
UK Royal Air Force attend the Red Flag exercises in Nevada
81
; there are naval exercises such 
as ‘Reliant Mermaid’ in the Mediterranean and US land forces conduct joint training with 
their Israeli counterparts in the Negev desert. In terms of sheer size, the UK has the largest 
‘footprint’ with over 800 of its personnel based in the US, whilst America has relatively few 
of its service men and women in Israel.
82
The relationships between the militaries is 
supplemented and underpinned by the defence trade relationships with engineers and 
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executives based in the allied country, guiding the purchase of defence equipment or working 
on joint ventures.  
Where the AASR differs from the IASR in terms of military-to-military cooperation is that 
the UK interfaces with America across the panoply of strategic issues, whereas the US-Israeli 
relationship focuses exclusively upon the Middle East. This is a reflection of the UK’s desire 
to be the partner of choice for the US globally. Commensurate with this aim, there are UK 
military representatives in all US strategic commands including Northern Command 
(NORTHCOM), Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM) and 
Strategic Command (STRATCOM).
83
 The largest contingent of around 50 British military 
officers, under a two-star general, is attached to US Central Command (CENTCOM) in 
Tampa, Florida, where operations for Iraq and Afghanistan were planned. Since 2009, three 
developments have enhanced the strategic relationship between the US and UK. First, the 
revival of the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee who survey the full range 
of issues affecting both countries.
84
 Second, the creation in May 2011 of the Joint Strategy 
Board to discuss and analyse key strategic challenges.
85
 Last, in April 2012, the two sides 
brought into force the UK-USA Defence Trade Treaty, which will assist the UK in obtaining 
privileged access to the American defence market and smooth the exchange of sensitive 
defence technologies.  
Unlike the US-UK defence relationship, there have been no new strategic level dialogues 
between the US and Israel over the last six years. The Joint Political-Military Group (JPMG) 
and the Joint Security Assistance Planning Group (JSAP) were both established in 1983, 
whilst the Defence Policy Advisory Group (DPAG) was created in the 1990s. The Strategic 
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Dialogue Group, which was created in 1999, remains the most senior, regular forum in which 
security issues are discussed. The worrying sign for the Israeli-American relationship was 
that the Obama administration and the Netanyahu government issued sharply different 
statements describing their strategic dialogue in 2014.
86
 Another worrying sign was that the 
Obama administration did not renew the Emergency Oil Supply Agreement with Israel when 
it expired in November 2014.
87
  
What makes the IASR distinct from the AASR is that the American commitment to Israel’s 
survival has been institutionalized by American legislation over the past decades. It has been 
within the US Congress, and particularly its Republican representatives, that support for 
Israel has been forthcoming, in contrast to the scratchy relationship with the Executive. This 
has been illustrated by the decision of the Congress to enact a series of laws aiming to 
preserve Israel’s QME. These laws create powerful inertia to preserve the special relationship 
with Israel and the Obama administration has been compelled to provide generous Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF) and privileged arms sales. After the passage of the 2008 
legislation, a bilateral QME working group between the US and Israel was created ‘allowing 
Israel to argue its case against proposed U.S. arms sales in the region’.88 The US-Israel 
Strategic Partnership Act of December 2014 elevated Israel’s status from a major non-NATO 
ally to a major strategic partner.  
The US-Israel and US-UK institutional relationships are a vital part of explaining the 
persistence of these special relationships during the Obama era.  The AASR has adapted to an 
evolving strategic context and has deepened in important respects including intelligence 
collaboration, defence procurement and strategic military dialogue. The same cannot be said 
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of the IASR. Divergences of interest have not significantly reduced the institutional 
relationship but they have constrained its development. Furthermore, competition and the 
pursuit of unilateral advantage, such as in the field of intelligence collection, have scarred the 
relationship and generated points of friction.
89
  
The prospects for the AASR and IASR after Obama  
No inter-state relationships are immutable; they reflect the changing calculations of interest 
amidst an evolving external environment. The Anglo-American and Israeli-American 
relationships are faced with the prospect of a new President in January 2017. Beginning in 
2011 Obama initiated an important shift in US foreign policy, a re-balancing towards the 
Asia-Pacific region.
90
 He also accelerated the timetable for the withdrawal of US troops from 
Iraq and in 2014 pulled out combat forces from Afghanistan. By doing so he signalled that 
the US was no longer willing to commit large-scale ground forces to the Middle East and 
proceeded to use airpower and targeted drone strikes against IS and terrorist adversaries in 
Syria, Iraq, Pakistan and Yemen. Against such a backdrop, what are the prospects for the 
AASR and IASR after Obama?  
America’s pivot to Asia may weaken the strategic dimensions of the AASR to some degree, 
given the fact that the UK will have less to offer its ally in that region. Nevertheless, the UK 
has distinctive historical relationships in parts of Asia — including Australia, Hong Kong, 
India, Pakistan and Singapore — that put it at an advantage compared to the US.  Its 
economic engagement with China will not prejudice the AASR because it will not weaken 
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their security relationship. Washington is also mindful that in re-balancing towards Asia it 
cannot afford to neglect either Europe or the Middle East.
91
  
Washington has been worried by the apparent desire of the UK to reduce its profile in world 
affairs.
92
 The Cameron government made swingeing cuts in UK defence spending following 
the global financial crisis
93
 did not play a prominent role in dealing with the Ukraine crisis 
and has committed itself to holding a referendum on its continued membership of the 
European Union by 2017. In addition, it drew back from becoming involved in the conflict in 
Syria.  
The UK was stung by the criticisms that its policies elicited from the US. In light of those 
criticisms the newly elected Cameron government expressed a determination to reassert its 
position in the world. In November, the UK produced its 2015 version of the SDSR in which 
it reaffirmed its sense of global ambition. There was a commitment to purchase a new 
maritime patrol aircraft, two Army strike brigades for expeditionary operations, new 
‘Protector’ drones and additional funding for Special Forces and cyber capabilities. The 
growing threat from IS led the UK to overcome its earlier hesitation and participate in an 
American-led air campaign in Syria. This was endorsed with the overwhelming support of the 
House of Commons on 2 December 2015. There appears every prospect that instability in the 
world will reinforce the shared geostrategic interests of the two governments and preserve 
their alignment in the future.  
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In the case of the IASR, the outlook is more uncertain. On the one hand, the Arab Spring has 
resulted in the collapse of some of Israel’s foremost adversaries, such as Syria. On the other, 
the diminution of traditional threats has rekindled expectations of progress in the Israeli-
Palestinian dispute, as illustrated by the additional 28 countries that have recognized a 
Palestinian state during Obama’s period in office.94 In addition, a window of opportunity has 
been provided for adversaries of Israel, such as Iran, to assert their ambitions. American 
policy will be driven by the reality that Israel continues to feel vulnerable, despite becoming 
the strongest military power in the Middle East. Because of this insecurity, Israel is prone to 
over-react to external threats which, in turn, impacts negatively on American foreign policy 
in the region. By reassuring Israel with the provision of military aid and diplomatic protection, 
the US can encourage Israel to act with restraint in the face of security challenges.
95
  
As regards the sentimental dimension of the two special relationships, the decline of the 
Anglo-Saxon population in the US and the increase in ethnic minorities may weaken the 
sense of common bonds and shared culture between the US and UK.
96
 Yet this is a long-term 
process that is unlikely to change their special relationship in the short to medium term. This 
contrasts with the prospect of preserving the sentimental attachment between Israel and the 
US. Whilst there will be strong and positive feelings expressed by Americans towards Israel, 
other parts of the US population are divided over its policies. The open fight between the 
Obama administration and the Israeli government with regard to the Iranian nuclear deal is 
over, culminating in the defeat of Prime Minister Netanyahu and his supporters in 
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Washington.
97
 But it leaves behind a legacy of mistrust that will be difficult to overcome. In 
addition, Palestinian issues will continue to plague the IASR and split American public 
opinion. It will be more difficult for Israel to enjoy bipartisan support in Washington on 
issues related to American vital interests, especially if Israel is only loved by half of the US. 
Recent tensions such as these have exposed the immaturity of the IASR. In future, the US and 
Israel need to learn how to manage turbulence in their relationship and be more relaxed about 
criticism from the other side. Much will depend on who is the next US President. A 
Democratic successor would be likely to continue the direction of travel of Obama and exert 
pressure on the Israeli government over its policies. A Republican President, on the other 
hand, might be more forgiving of Israeli settlement building and might take steps to reverse 
the nuclear deal with Iran. Under such circumstances it is possible to envisage a less tense 
US-Israeli relationship and even the possibility of it improving.   
As regards the future of the institutional dimension, it will continue to generate ‘stickiness’ 
within both special relationships. In the case of the AASR, the UK will have to work harder 
to preserve the intimacy that resulted from conducting military operations alongside each 
other in Iraq and Afghanistan. In order to prevent their militaries from losing this closeness 
and drifting apart, the UK will need to train and exercise with its larger ally and preserve the 
bonds of friendship that were generated in the recent past. In his memoirs, former Chief of 
the Defence Staff Sir David Richards recounts the efforts he made to keep close contacts with 
senior officers in the US military, journeying on one occasion across the Atlantic to attend the 
retirement of a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen.
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The institutional linkages between the US and Israel have continued to be robust despite the 
recent coldness of the political relationship. The US and Israeli armed forces have retained 
their close cooperation. For example, in June 2015, the US and Israeli air forces signed a 
strategic agreement entitled the ‘Air Senior National Representative’ (ASNR), that gathers 
together existing strands of collaboration.
99
 Similarly, Israeli naval forces have a new round 
of training exercise in the Mediterranean with their US counterparts.    
Conclusion 
The fact that both the US-UK and the US-Israeli relationships are special is beyond question: 
the breadth and the significance of their security interactions are testament to their unique 
status. This article has analysed the continuation of these two special relationships during the 
Obama era by drawing on a theory of alliance persistence. There are three pillars 
underpinning the persistence of the AASR and IASR: reciprocity in advancing shared 
geostrategic interests; sentimental attachments and institutionalization of security 
cooperation. The three pillars remain strong in the AASR, but have been more under pressure 
and shown signs of weakening in the IASR.  
Within persistence, relationships vary. It would be misleading to suggest that the AASR and 
IASR are equally close relationships and that neither had changed. The UK enjoys a closer 
relationship with the US than Israel and it has been subject to less deterioration over time. 
The UK’s geostrategic interests remain closest to those of the US as they share the ambition 
to uphold a Western-led order. The security relationship between the UK and the US is based 
on a shared assessment of global security risks; itself the product of an intimate institutional 
dialogue between their defence and intelligence officials. The UK is eager to support the 
US’s role as a provider of security and is willing to contribute, both materially and politically, 
                                           
99
 Aryeh Savir, ‘Israeli and US Air Forces Sign Historic Strategic Pact’, World Israel News, 14 June 2015, 
<http://worldisraelnews.com/israeli-and-us-air-forces-sign-strategic-pact/>.  
32 
 
towards that goal. The UK will continue to behave as the US’s foremost ally, in turn, 
benefitting from American practical assistance and from the leadership positions and 
resulting influence that the US confers. 
In contrast, geostrategic factors have altered the IASR. Israel’s relationship with the US has 
focused narrowly around the stability of the Middle East. As existential threats to Israeli 
security have diminished, the country has become less dependent on US guarantees and the 
provision of military equipment. This has resulted in an increase in Israel’s freedom of 
manoeuvre and a corresponding loss in American leverage over its policymaking. There is 
now much more of an interdependent relationship between the two countries where Israeli 
actions could serve to drag the US into conflict. The strategic interests of the two sides have 
diverged, with the result that American policy is preoccupied with the goal of restraining 
Israel. The US will not abandon Israel, there are too many domestic pressures preventing this, 
but is likely to be more discerning in the future about the lengths to which it will go to 
support its ally.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
